INTRODUCTION
All too readily, we conceive of our relation to the image in terms of
the relation to a painting, where a passive onlooker contemplates a
still image, that is neatly separated form the space where the onlooker
is situated: the familiar paradigm of the 'aesthetic contemplation'.
With conventional images, this approach is not problematic, but
it turns out to be inappropriate as soon as we are dealing with
panoramas, 'immersive images', virtual reality, not to mention
'interactive images'. And it is the question whether this paradigm
applies not only to visual, but also to aural images - there are those
who have the impression of being immersed in the surround sound of the
cinema, or, somewhat less prosaic, of being swallowed, like Isolde, in
Wagner's 'wogender Schwall' - or to the images in which the reader is
immersed who stares motionless to the pages of his book, not to mention
the dreams of the sleeper, who lies for dead under the blankets, whereas
he experiences the wildest adventures in his dreams.
The example of the dream suggests that there are two instances that
may relate to the image: the dreamer in the dream, and the dreamer in bed.
And, also here it is not evident what may be the counterparts of this
couple when reading a book, hearing music, or looking at a picture.
Reasons enough the write a text about the relation between the image -
all kinds of images - and the two kinds of perceivers that we will learn
to discern below. Since images are traditionally equated with visual
images, we will first handle the visual image - although we will deal
with more kinds of images than the paradigmatic two-dimensional still
images. Next, we will apply the analysis to other kinds of images,
although we will restrict ourselves to those who are most relevant to
our subject: the aural image, the dream image, the imagined image, and
the story (narrative). In the process, we will find not only
expected similarities, but also meaningful differences. Only when we
have a full survey of all the variants will we be in a proper position to
formulate a general theory about the relation of between the image and
its perceivers in a last paragraph, that is at the same time a
summary.
This text is based on my book on the image, where the
problem is dealt with exhaustively and in a broader context.
IMAGE MEDIUM, MEDIUM FIELD, AND
IMAGE SPACE IN THE VISUAL IMAGE
It will prove to be useful to dwell somewhat on the structure of the
image itself. The visual image appears in a fragment of the real world: the
image medium:
the configuration of light in stained glass, a
painted panel or canvas, printed paper, developed photo paper, or the
visible three-dimensional surface of a three-dimensional sculpture in
diverse materials.
That image medium is a real (light-)object in a real environment, which
comprises not
only the
medium support
(paper, canvas, panel, film projector and
screen; bronze, marble, wood, silicone or epoxy, the bodies of
actors), but also the surrounding reality that has nothing to do with
the image: the wall on which the painting hangs, the theatre building
around the scene. Where the medium extends, the real world is replaced
with what we call the image space. Let us first examine how real space
and image space are separated.
With two-dimensional image-media, there is either an explicit separation
through a frame (painting, photo, film), or an undefined transition
between the image medium that is read as the space surrounding the figure,
and the real surface on which the figure is painted (think of Lascaux,
or of graffiti). The place where the image medium extends is the
medium field
. Also three-dimensional image-media (sculptures,
actors) can stand freely in really space, or be separated from it,
minimally by a pedestal or a scene, maximally by a niche for sculpture,
or a picture frame stage for actors.
The resort to a frame, a niche or a stage suggests that the separation
between medium field and real world is also the separation of real space
and image space - that the painting is a window, and the stage a peep
box (with Diderot's invisible 'fourth wall'). In fact, the image
space extends outside the frame and the peep box: not only upwards and backwards, to the
left and to the right, but also forwards. With a still image, that is
not evident, because we never get to see the space outside the frame,
but with a moving image, it comes into view as soon as the camera moves.
The paradigms of window or peep box suggest that the image
space stops where the opening is cut in the wall. In fact, the room
where Velazquez paints, extends in the space where the onlooker is
located, although it is not visible there. The old trick of having the
portrait look the viewer in the eyes, or - somewhat more sophisticated -
having the royal couple mirrored in the background of the studio -
acknowledges the existence of the invisible space before the frame,
but is only a trick, since it suggests that its content would be visible.
The image space before the wall coincides with the real space where the
onlooker finds himself within his real body. And that goes not only for
the image space outside the frame and the stage, but also for the
visible image space within it, since it contains the elements of the
real world that are hidden by the image medium: the medium supports
(the panel behind the layer of paint, the face behind the mask or the
make up) as well as the real world as such (the wall behind the panel or
the building behind the stage). That is all the more obvious when the
three-dimensional image has no background or no platform of its own,
like in Antony Gormley's 'Another
Place', where the real world remains visible between and behind the sculptures.
The paradigm of the image obfuscates not only that the image space
extends before the window, but also behind it. It is evident, then, that
there are two parallel worlds, and that the real body of the onlooker nor
the
medium supports are part of the image space. Although Velazquez would
have us believe otherwise, the real king and the queen that come to
judge the painting are not the king and the queen that appear as mirror
images in the image space, and that is even less the case with the
contemporary onlookers of Las Meninas: these ordinary mortals are not
in the Alcazar, but in the Prado, in the room where the
image medium is, and where the Alcazar appears in the image space.
Not only the paradigm of the window hinders a proper understanding of
image space, also the spatial characteristics of the image medium
continue to mislead us. For, next to the
scenic variant
of the medium
field (defined by frame, niche or peep box), there is also
the
panoramic
variant, where the medium field unfolds into a
ring around the onlooker - two-dimensionally in the 'panorama',
three-dimensionally in settings like Antonin Artaud's 'theatre de la
cruauté'. Thereby, the 'fourth wall' extends laterally into a
transparent zone cut out of a real space that is reduced to the cylinder
where the onlooker is situated, like in a classic panorama or in 'immersive
cinema' (360¨° cinema). A further step is the extension into a sphere
around the viewer, like in a planetarium or in 'immersive full-dome'
cinema, where what remains visible from the real world, is reduced to
the floor and the body of the viewer. In a special variant -
'immersive
imaging' - the medium field is extended over
the six sides of a cube and over the body of the viewer, so that the
real world is no longer visible at all; together with the body of the
viewer, it has disappeared in the worm hole of the pupil. Next to the
two-dimensional immersive image, where a third dimension is merely
suggested on a spherical of cubic screen, there is also the
three-dimensional one; a sculpture group like 'Another Place', where the
viewer can walk among the sculptures, like among the miniature buildings
of Madurodam, or in the theatre where the spectators enter the image
space like in 'Sleep no more' van Punchdrunk (2011). Just like the image
space of Las Meninas extends into the space before the wall, it also
extends into the cylinder contained by the panorama. And that is
especially the case when the third dimension is real, like with a
sculpture group, where the impression of being part of the image space
is even stronger, but nevertheless false: the body of the viewer is
neither in the room where Velazquez is painting, nor in the landscape
that surrounds him panoramicly or spherically, nor in the image space of
the sculpture group. In these parallel worlds, there is not only a
difference between the (image medium in) real space and the image space,
but also between what we will call the
real subject
- the subject that perceives the real world as real - and what we will
call
image subject*
- the subject that perceives the image as an image.
IMAGE SPACE AND IMAGE SUBJECT IN THE VISUAL IMAGE
Apparently, the real subject is able to put between brackets everything
that is visible, but does not belong to the medium field: not only the
medium support and the frame itself, but above all what outside the
frame is not only visible, but perceptible alltogether. To those excluded perceptions
belongs the body in the first place, the perception of its inner life
included (body, soul and spirit). Of the entire real world outside the
frame, only the eye remains, which, together with the corollary brain
modules, is the real substrate of the image subject, the counterpart of
the image medium, the real substrate of the image space. Together with
the real body, the real subject is left behind in the real world -
excluded form the image space, rather than immersed in it.
What about the image subject? The image subject always looks from
the periphery of the image space, also when we are dealing with a
panoramic or a spherical medium, that cannot be perceived as a whole,
but only scenically. The eye looks as it were through a keyhole into the
visual image space, and is hence part of it, although it is not really
emerged in it like the ear. When the visual appearance of the image
subject wants to appear in the image, the image subject can only see it
partially: its hands or feet, or the front of its body. Let us remind
that we are talking of the appearance that belongs to the image subject,
like the feet that appear on the screen when the camera is directed
downwards, not about the appearance of a double, like a mirror image:
that is viewed as if it were a third person. We are talking about an
image subject that perceives not only the landscape through which it is
riding, but also its hand on the steering wheel; or about that man who
would stage himself as
Casanova
dancing with an automaton, and who would enter the visual image space
with his hands reaching out to the puppet. These examples teach us that
it is not always the real subject that is transformed into an image subject. It
often has to undergo a metamorphosis. As a rule, it takes the place of
the artist who made the image. But the artist can show the image from
the point of view of a character. When the real subject is transformed
into the image subject, it does more than merely change from time and
place: it also embodies itself in another character. Here, we are
dealing with immersion indeed, albeit a partial one in double respect:
the image subject can only have a visual appearence - no audible one, let
alone and inner one - and that only partially.
Just like the real subject situates itself in the real world, the image
subject situates itself in the image space. That explains why the body
that would fit the image subject has not necessarily the same size as
the real subject. That is apparent from the fact that we do not consider
the person on the passport photo a dwarf, nor the landscape on the
postcard a miniature landscape. And that is because the image subject
looks with the eye of the real subject, but not from within its body,
which it
left behind in the real world: it adjusts its size to that in the photo.
That goes not only for the size, but also for the distance: the image
subject see the figures on Las Meninas from a distance that is appropriate
to their size on the painting, apart from the fact whether the real
subject is looking a the three meter high painting in the Prado, or at a
small reproduction in a book, or at a projection on a giant screen. Only
when the image subject sees the real subject in the mirror do real
subject and image subject coincide and are both subjects looking from the
same place. In all the cases where the size of image space and real space
do not coincide, the scale of the image subject and its distance from
the appearances in the image space do not match those of the real subject.
But only the real subject is aware of that, since the image subject
is absorbed in the image space. Nevertheless, it is not easy to
convince it of that truth: from the fact that the image space
appears where the image medium is situated, it all too readily concludes
by analogy that the image subject looks from where it looks - although
it is impossible to explain, then, why a real subject that would look upwards
to a giant poster of Dali's 'Christ of Saint John of the Cross' would
nevertheless look down from heaven on the figure of Christ as an image
subject, from a vantage point that would be situated far above and
behind the real subject, and from within a body that would be far
larger, but that, in the image space, would not differ from the vantage
point which it would take and the scale which it would have when it looked at a small
reproduction. What, in the case of Dali's picture, is merely a thought
experiment, is a sheer fact in the film, where the scale of the images
is changing continuously: whereas there is a constant change of
distance and scale of the image subject, the place and the scale of the
real subject remain constant. With panoramic and spherical medium
fields, the radius is given. The length of the radius determines the
scale of the crater that has to appear in the panorama and the corollary
size of the image subject. Whereas zooming in or out is no problem with
a scenic image, it is impossible with a panorama, unless it is in one
direction with the opposite movement in the opposite side. In
combination with the problem that a panorama is always scanned
scenically - so that it would have to be determined in advance in which
direction the image subject would have to look at the panorama - this
explains why the image subject does not appear with its own appearance
in a panoramic or spherical image.
That the image subject leaves the real body behind, takes and
appropriate size, looks from an appropriate distance, takes, when
necessary, another identity, and always changes from place and time,
goes also for three-dimensional image image-media, with the proviso that
the mostly variable perspective is no longer determined, like with a
two-dimensional medium, so that the real subject, and hence the
image subject, can freely approach the image from whatever vantage
point. Even when the real subject in its real body looks at a crib on a
drawer, the image subject in the image space has not the impression of
looking at tiny human beings like a cyclops. Rather does it look from
the heights with a bird's eye view, and, had it a body, that would have
the same size in the image space as the figures in the crib. And even
when the real subject looks from within its much smaller body to
Michelangelo's giant David, the image subject has not at all the
impression of being a dwarf looking up at a giant. Rather does it look
from a lower vantage point to a figure on a pedestal, and from a body of
approximately the same size. When the image subject wants to look at
miniature sculptures from an eye-level view, it will have to take the
appropriate position, and when it would like to walk between the
figures, these would have to have the same size as the viewer, like in a
tableau vivant.
RELATION BETWEEN IMAGE,
IMAGE SUBJECT AND REAL SUBJECT: (INTER)ACTION AND IMMERSION IN THETHE
VISUAL IMAGE
Now that we have clearly distinguished real world and image world, real
subject and image subject, we can study the relation between the image
and both subjects. Traditionally it is assumed that the relation between
image and viewer is or has to be purely contemplative. Nowadays, the
focus is rather on interaction - understood as a circular, non-linear
concatenation of action and reaction between image and subject - or on
immersion - which implies that there are images from which the viewer is
excluded. It is evident that we will have to clearly distinguish between
interaction with the real or with the image subject, and immersion of
the real or of the image subject.
Let us first examine the relation between image and image subject. When
thinking of a still two-dimensional visual image, it seems all to
plausible that this relation is purely contemplative. But this view is
no longer tenable when the subject is moving in a visual image space
among other visual appearances: the vantage point from which the image
subject looks varies, and that has its bearings on how the world
appears. With three-dimensional images, the movement is produced by the
real subject that walks around in the medium field, and, since this is
an interaction of the real subject with the image, we have to handle
this below. With a two-dimensional scenic display, it is either a
disembodied eye that moves in the image space, or a gaze that is
embodied in a moving and acting character that often appears in the
image, were it alone for its hands on the steering wheel. With a panoramic
of spherical image, it is only the visual appearances that are able to move
in the image space, whereas the image subject cannot change place, and
cannot appear in the image. When the image subject moves in the
image space, especially when it also appears within the image, the
relation is no longer contemplative, but (inter)active. We know that the
appearance is only visual, which implies that, in as far as the image subject has
a will, it cannot but look as an outsider at its own
actions. In that sense, the relation of the image subject to the
image remains purely contemplative. It cannot influence what it does or
how it appears: that forever remains the prerogative of the real subject
that produces the image (mostly the artist).
Let us, next, examine the interaction with the real subject: in how far does the real subject interact with the image and
vice versa.
It is evident, then, that there can be no interaction whatsoever between
real subject and image. Otherwise than reality, which is
multisensory, the visual image exists only in the visual dimension, in
a world reduced to mere light: as already Narcissus knew all too well,
you cannot touch a visual image, let alone hear or smell it, and since
it has substance nor soul, however hard the real subject may try to
address it, that will have no effect whatsoever on what appears in the
image. On the other hand, the real subject can effectively interact with
the only thing that is real in the visual image: the light, as it its
captured in the image medium.
There is interaction with that light already during the pure perception
of the visual image. For the real subject always perceives the visual
world outside the frame, parts of its own body included, not to mention
the other sensory dimensions of reality, since, otherwise than the
image subject, the real subject is not a mere eye: it also hears, feels
and smells not only the outside world, but also itself. Already for the
pure constitution of an image, an active intervention of the real
subject is needed: the putting between brackets of whatever does not
belong to the image medium. This is facilitated through the darkening of
the theatre, sitting in comfortable chairs, and what have you. Such
negative interaction is turned into positive interaction, when the real
subject enables the image subject to explore the image space when walking
in the real space between three-dimensional images (sculptures, actors,
or miniature buildings), or when the real subject has to use its
keyboard to produce ever new two-dimensional perspectives on a
three-dimensional space on a screen. This relation is no longer
contemplative, although it is equally put between brackets, so that the
image subject can contemplate the image undisturbed. Such putting
between brackets is from the beginning obsolete when it is relegated to
machines, as when the subject is driven around like in a dark ride.
But the most conspicuous interaction is during the production of the
image as such: when painting, sculpting or acting. During the creation
of an image, there is a continuous interaction of the artist with the
image as a medium: the artist as a real subject is the creator of the
image that he at the same time contemplates as an image subject. The
act of creation can be distributed over two specialists: as when a
concept of Sol LeWitt is executed by other artists, or when
actors play a written scenario. In some cases, a part of the execution is
relegated to the real subject itself. That is the case with the many
images where the real subject has to fill in the suggestion - in the
first place of the third dimension with two-dimensional images. In other cases, it is purely
instrumental
actions like the handling of the projector, the insertion of slides, or
the manipulation of the camera. More sophisticated is the manipulation
of a joystick that activates pre-programmed sequences of images (also
those of the adversary in a computer game), or the transmission of
movements of head or legs when walking in an environment with VR-glasses.
In another variant, a specialised producer provides the puppet, with
which the real subject has to play - or to dance, like in Fellini's
Casanova. With still other forms of productive interaction, it is
sensors that activate pixels, so that the silhouette of the passers-by
appear on the wall. The production of the images is not always relegated
to automated or real producers: the consumer of the image can produce
it himself, as when someone makes a drawing or plays a character for
his own use - although that is not so evident, because when I stage myself
before a mirror, I am cooperating with an automated producer again.
Images are interactive in a second sense, hence, during all forms of
production of the image - and not only when using electronic devices,
joysticks or keyboards. That relation is not contemplative, but active,
and it is, just like perceptive interaction, put between brackets: the
artist that conjures up an image on his canvas, the gamer
who intervenes in the actions of the image on his computer screen, or
the person who admires himself in the mirror, are concentrating on the
image, and put everything that contributes to its production between
brackets. In so far as(parts of) the production can be relegated
to specialists, such putting between brackets becomes obsolete, and
with two-dimensional images even the taking of a perspective is
monopolised by the artist. The real subject can then be deactivated
completely, so that the image subject can fully concentrate on the
contemplation of the image and the actions of its visual appearance
in it.
Next to the interaction of the real subject with the image(medium) there
is also the interaction of the image with the real subject.
To begin with, there is the whole series of interactions that remain
restricted to changes in the real subject - and which remain
contemplative in that the real subject does not proceed to action: from
purely spiritual reactions like gettinginsight, over more
'psychic' ones like emotional reactions of all kinds, to 'somatic' ones
like getting goosebumps or the catch in the throat. Otherwise than with
perceptive of productive activity, the active body is not put between
brackets here, but rather consciously perceived. That the real subject reacts
to what there is to be seen in the image space, does not mean that it
belongs to the
image space, let alone that the appearances in the image would take
notice of its presence. Nevertheless, artist are keen of having us
believe the opposite by resorting to the old mimetic trick of eyes gazing
at the onlooker. But, even though the Venus of Urbino or the Olympia are
gazing at the real subject, it is nevertheless only the disembodied eye
of the image subject
that is present in their room: what the real subject
thinks, feels or does in the real room where the picture is hanging,
will forever escape their view. And, whether the real subject feels addressed
by the Pantokrator looking down on him, or rather shows his middle
finger, the divine eyes continue to gaze undisturbed into the space
before them where there is nothing to be seen. However the real subject
might react, it remains forever excluded from the image.
The extent to which this is the case would appear as soon as - in a reversal of
the story of Narcissus - the boy in the image would not only gaze at the
boy above the water, but would also try to touch it. Suppose its hand
would be able to reach further than the surface of the water, the encounter would
only reveal in all clarity that he is merely a light being without
substance that would in vain try to penetrate the world where the real
subject is a being in flesh and blood.
The reaction of the real subject to the image is no longer contemplative
when it unfolds to action. In a first series of cases the action leads
to new perceptions and hence makes and end to the perception of the
image. That is the case when the image incites to purchase, to
political action - or just to phantasising: to create new images. In a
second series of reactions, the contemplative relation to the image is
maintained, but extended with action of the real subject in the real
world. Since time immemorial, man uses to pray in the sight
of images of ancestors, ghost, saints and gods, like Saint Jerome below
with Jesus on the cross:
Many a monk has chastised himself in the face of the suffering Christ.
And already the Greeks used to get aroused in the sight of the image of
bodily beauty. The medium support can thereby be used as an instrument,
like when the real subject approaches the ballet dancer no longer as the visual
appearance of a character, but as tangible
body. That action of the real subject in the real world and
contemplative relation with the image are compatible, does not mean that
the real subject is immersed in the image: rather does the image descend
into the real world where it takes the place of a real appearance. That
holds true even when the image subject appears in the image as a visual
appearance: even when the actor sees his arms appear as those of
Casanova in the image where also the automaton appears, the actor knows
that the arms under the sleeves are his, and he feels that he does not
dance with a clothed automaton, but with an actress of flesh and blood that
plays the automaton - he is not immersed, hence, in, but rather
excluded from the image produced by himself.
These forms of interaction in both directions must be distinguished form
cases where the real subject interacts not only with the image, but also
with other subjects. Such was
already the case with cooperation during the production of the image.
But a more spectacular example is the computer game, where images are
used to enable a contest: from the imitated
horses of chess, over playing football with three-dimensional players in table
football or with two-dimensional figures on the computer screen, to the slaying of
monsters in the guise of an imaginary warrior. As long as the real
players continue to be clearly visible, the odds are low that the
impression arises that two armies are confronting each other, rather
than two chess players. That becomes more plausible when the real
players disappear from view: the adversary may be replaced with a
computer program that generates figures, and the players themselves with
figures on the screen. It becomes even more probable when the image subject
appears in the image with parts of its body, as when it sees its hands
steering. But, just as
the image subject in a film script contemplates its own adventures, also
this image subject cannot act on its own: it only steers or fires when
the real player before the screen presses the button. As an image
subject, the real subject - the player - merely contemplates the moves
that it has executed in the image. No matter the extent to which parts of the game
or of the player may be turned into an image, the player as a real subject
is never put between brackets: he rather continues to be the real
subject of the proceedings.
He interacts with his adversary in the first place, and merely uses the
images as a means. Rather than the real subject, it is the image that is
put between brackets here. Only seeming immersion also here. (See also 'Mimesis
and play'.) The interaction between the players through the image
must not be confused with the interaction of the players during the
production of the image, that can be a form of interaction with
co-workers in its turn (the artist who cut the chess pieces or who wrote the
computer programs).
IMAGE MEDIUM, MEDIUM FIELD AND IMAGE SPACE IN THE
AURAL IMAGE
Time has come now to assess whether these findings on the visual image
apply also to the aural image. Elsewhere
we explain in detail what we have to understand by an 'aural image'.
Suffice it here to sum up the most important categories: the rather
recent domain of (mimetic) soundscapes (sounds from a forest, the
underground, spaceships and what have you), the world of purely aural lyric
poetry and
drama (radio plays), and, of course, the world of
mimetic music
(aural images of singers - lamenting Ariannas - and dances - Beethovens
scherzos).
With all these aural images the image medium consists of sounds that
become audible in real space, amid an encompassing silence - the aural medium field.
The necessity to separate such an aural medium field from the aural
reality is not so urgent as with the visual image, since sounds are only
heard when they are produced, so that it suffices to be silent to
eliminate the real aural world. The aural medium
field can unfold scenically before the real subject (orchestra,
stereo-installation), panoramically (surround sound) or spherically
around the real subject - just thing of Ivan Vyshnegradsky's 'Temple of Light',
Skriabin's 'Prometheus' (1911), the 'Phillips Pavilion' by Varèse
and Xenakis (1958), Stockhausens spherical auditorium in Osaka (1970)
and Luigi Nono's concept for the Prometeo (1984). The medium field can
be two-dimensional and merely suggest a third dimension (like with scenic
stereo or panoramic surround sound, and all the spherical spaces
mentioned above), or, in principle, three-dimensional (although I know
only of real, non-mimetic soundscapes like the Simfoniya Gudkov (1922)
by Arsenij Avraamov). With aural images, there are no audible medium
supporst, but only visible ones:
loudspeakers, singers and instruments. It is important to remind that
the disposition of the visual medium supports in space is the visual
equivalent of the disposition of the sounds in the medium field, but not
of their disposition in the aural image space: the difference is minimal
with three-dimensional disposition, already more important with stereo
and surround sound, and fundamental with the advent of
musical space.
When the aural medium field is scenic, it is situated before the real
subject that is located with its real body in real space. It isnot evident that there is a real aural space around the real subject, since
it is normally silent there. The real aural space manifests itself only when sounds are produced like coughing or shuffling chairs,
although it is filtered away by the real subject. With a panoramic
setting, themedium field surrounds
the body of the real subject, and with a spherical setting also the
space above and below. In all those medium
fields, aural space with the concomitant aural image
subject unfolds.
IMAGE SPACE AND IMAGE SUBJECT IN THE
AURAL IMAGE
As for the aural image, the real subject can put between brackets
everything
that does not belong to the aural image space. But there is not
really a problem here, because real space is mostly eliminated through
simple observance of silence. On the other hand, the medium supports are
rather conspicuous here, although they are not audible, but visible:
the instruments and the musicians, the scene and the concert hall. Ideally,
they are excluded through closing the eyes, as not only devotees of
music, but also many musicians do, or by neutralising sight through
staring, like with
daydreaming. We know meanwhile that not only the real audible and
visible environment is excluded from aural space, but, except for the
ear, also the entire visible and tangible body, with all its sensory
impressions, the inner ones included. From the entire real world outside
the aural medium field, only the ear is left, which, together with the
corollary brain modules, is the real substrate of the aural image subject.
In a scenic disposition, the aural image subject
is situated at the periphery of the image space. Since it
hears sounds only in front of it, it can no longer appearin the
image space with its aural appearance. Sounds have no front or rear, so
that sound can only be the appearance of the image subject when it
resounds where the real subject hears - and that is impossible
with scenic disposition. When the real subject hears its own voice in
the space before it, it can only interpret it as the voice of a double - like an
echo. Just like the visual image subject, the disembodied image subject
situates itself at the appropriate distance from
the aural appearances in the image, and it also takes the appropriate
shape. Sounds a such do not have a spatial extension, although they
belong to sound sources that are big or small - of which pitch is a good
indication (the rustle of mice versus the drone of elephants). That does
not prevent them from having a scale that is indicated through the
volume; when one whisper sounds louder than another, it is ascribed
to a larger whisperer. That is why the softly speaking voices, like
those in the Hyperion of the Prometeo, or softly singing voices that
nevertheless resound loudly, like the Mitternacht in Mahler's Third
Symphony, appear to be big. But, apart from such relative loudness, loud
sounds appear to be near, and soft sounds to be far away, and with
crescendo, sounding object seem to come nearer while, with decrescendo,
they seem to recede (Borodin's steppes, Respighi's 'Pini di Roma', or Messiaens 'Eglise éternelle').
That goes also for the image subject in panoramic and spherical
dispositions, with the sole difference that the image subject can only
be located in the centre of the image space, at the same place where
the real subject is situated in the middle of the image-media (the scale
of which determines the distance to the image subject). Otherwise than
with the visual panorama, which can only be scanned scenically, the aural panorama
can be heard as a whole; in the aural image space, the sounding objects organise
themselves around this centre in the periphery, in all directions and at
diverse distances from the image subject - especially when it is one
single sound that resounds from all directions in a reverberating space,
so that it seems as if the entire space has become a sounding aether (e.g.
Phil Niblock). Otherwise than with visual space, there is full
immersion here, especially when musical space unfolds, so that space
extends to the height and the depth
(see Prometeo). In the centre, the aural image subject
can become audible. It suffices to have its speaking or singing resound
there, through surround sound or placing a loudspeaker, or by
having the real subject perform the voice of a character, like Zarathustra
speaking 'Aber ich
lebe in meinem eignen Lichte, ich trinke die Flammen in mich zurück, die
aus mir brechen.' It is conceivable that other sounds may be heard in
the periphery of the centre where the voice of the image subject
resound s - like in a
soundscape in which the image subject in the centre would have resound the
voice of Saint Francis, and the singing of his birds in the periphery.
Not only parts of the aural appearance would be audible here, like with
the visual appearance, but the integral aural appearances. Otherwise than with the visual image, immersion would be complete in a double
respect: central and integral - albeit within the aural dimension.
Although it is merely a theoretical possibility, the above would also
hold true for three-dimensional aural image-media (image-media where the
sounds resound at the place where they are situated in the image space),
on the understanding that the perspective would no longer be fixed like
with a two-dimensional image medium (scenic, panoramic of
spherical). Although the real subject could hear the miniature rendering
of the sounds of a zoo from tiny loudspeakers at the place where the
animals are supposed to be, in the image space the
image subject would perceive that space from the height, and, seen from
real space, have a body that would fit the scale of the animals in the
zoo. In order to hear the sounds as they would be heard from the ground
level, the image subject would have to approach it from ear-height.
Ands in order to be able to move among the birdsong resounding from
loudspeakers in the trees of a park, they should have a loudness
appropriate to their visual size, which would automatically be the case
in a purely aural 'immersive theatre of voices'.
RELATION BETWEEN IMAGE, IMAGE
SUBJECT AND REAL SUBJECT:
(INTER)ACTION AND IMMERSION IN THE AURAL IMAGE
After having discerned real world an image space, real subject and image subject
also in the aural image, we can proceed to examining in how far what
we contended about the relation between visual image, real subject and
image subject also applies to the aural image.
Let us first examine the relation between aural image and aural image
subject. When thinking of the recording of the sounds of a train, the
voices of actors, the lamenting of Arianna, it seems all too plausible
to claim that there is no interaction between image subject and image -
that we are dealing with a contemplative relation. But, also here, the
thesis is no longer tenable when the aural image subject is moving in
aural space (for instance when riding through a subway tunnel) - although this does not affect the appearance of the
sounds, but only their orientation and their loudness. Only with three-dimensional image-media
would the real subject have to enable the movement of the image subject
through moving between the sound sources, but that would be an
interaction with the real subject, which will be dealt with below. With two-dimensional
rendering (scenic, panoramic of spherical), it is a disembodied ear that
moves in the image space, either in that the
image subject changes its position in relation to the place where the
sounds resound (which is only possible with a scenic disposition and
with the equivalents of close up or zooming in or out), or in that the
sounds in the image space are moving with respect to the
image subject (panoramic and spherical disposition). But in all cases,
there is interaction of the image subject with the (appearances in) the image space -
although this interaction is contemplative in that the image subject can
only passively contemplately its aural appearance.
Let us, next, examine the interaction between real subject and image:
how the real subject interacts with the image and the image with the
real subject.
Here also, the subject cannot interact with the image, but only with
what is real in it; the sound as it is produced by the medium supports.
The real subject interacts already with the aural image when listening
to it. For, although it is relatively easy to put the real aural world
between brackets, the eye is not so easily neutralised: it cannot help
to
look at the disposition of the loudspeakers and the spectacle of the
musicians. Already to the pure constitution of the aural image, an active
intervention of the real subject is needed (unless it is facilitated by
the darkening of the room, like with Georg F. Haas ''In Vain'. Such
negative interaction - putting between brackets - would become positive
when the image subject would walk around through the body of the real
subject in a hypothetical real space between the loudspeakers of a
soundscape. How the real subject can effectively interact with the image
via the medium, however, is only fully evident during the production of the aural image:
whereas with the still visual image the production is only visible in
the studio, but not in the museum or in thee cinema, the aural image
cannot be separated from its production. The man who operates the wind
machine, the performer who recites a lyrical poem, or the woman who
sings the lamento d'Arianna: they are all at the same time real subject
that produces an aural image, and image subject that listens to the
aural image. In
al these cases there is interaction of the real subject with the image
(medium). But it is put between brackets; the performer or the musician
who produce the aural image, concentrate on the image. The relegation of
the production to specialists releases the image subject from every
productive (and with two-dimensional aural images also of every
perceptive) effort, so that it can remain inactive and devote itself
entirely on the contemplation of the image. Rather than with immersion,
we are dealing herewith two kinds of expulsion of the real subject.
Next tot the interaction of the real subject with the image (medium),
there is also the interaction of the image with the real subject.
To begin with, there is the whole series of reactions that remain
restricted to internal - spiritual, psychic and somatic - changes and
hence continue to be contemplative.
Otherwise than with perceptive or productive activity, the activity is
not put between brackets here, but rather experienced deliberately. It is
clear, however, that the real subject does not thereby become a player
in the image space: it is not addressed by the lamenting Arianna, let
alone that it feels prompted to comfort her. Just like with the gaze of
visual images, addressing the listener, especially in lyrical poetry can
arise the - nevertheless false - illusion that the real subject is
integrated in the aural image space: think of a Commendatore that
would not address don
Giovanni but yourself. Or, to try another reversal than that of Narcissus in
the visual image, we could image how, in a surround setting, the voice
of Euridice would address us as if we were Orpheus, and how we would
hear her voice approach and become silent until, eventually,
the sound of a kiss would resound at the place where our lips are. That
our lips would nevertheless feel nothing, would make it abundantly clear
how Eurydice is only a being without substance that, as a purely aural
appearance, would in vain try to penetrate the world where the real
subject is a visible body of flesh and blood.
The reaction of the real subject to the image is no longer contemplative
when it proceeds to action. In a first series of cases, this leads to
new perceptions and hence to the suspension of the perception of the
image. That is the case when the music inspires revolutionary action, or
when it inspires fantasising -
and hence the producing of new images. In a second series of cases, the image subject
continues to contemplate the image, while the real subject proceeds with
an activity with its real body in the real world that is compatible with
it: as when the image subject would listen to a speech of Hitler, while
his right arm could not help coming in erection; or when it would listen
to an erotic voice, while the real body in the real world would indulge
in masturbation. That is all the more probable when the medium support
in the real world is gratifying in its own right, as when the real
subject would no longer regard the body of the singer as the body of a
character, but as the body of the singer (Onassis wit his Casta Diva). Here,
the contemplative approach of the aural image by the image subject goes
hand in hand with active interaction of the real subject with the real
world. Also here, the activity of the real body is not put between
brackets: it rather effortlessly fuses with the perception of the image
by the image subject. And also here, despite all interaction, the action
of the real subject does not become part of the image, but continues to
happen in a parallel real world, so that there is no immersion
whatsoever.
In the case of aural images there is - apart from addressing the
listener - another special case of interaction of the image with the real
subject: the activation of the real body through the presence of
movement conjuring signs
in spoken text (speech choirs) and (mimetic) music. The aural
image subject has no physical body and cannot proceed to speaking,
singing or dancing together - which remains the privilege of the real
subject. The real subject can thereby restrict itself to feeling the
mere impulse to speak, sing or dance, but, more often, it proceeds to
the execution of the real thing with its tangible body in the real
world. There are two possibilities, then: either the real subject
proceeds with reciting, singing or playing, and hence with producing a double of
the aural images that incited them to recite, play or sing; or they
proceed with dancing; and are thus turned into visual images (still with
mimetic music). Each image producing real subject is at the same time
the contemplative admirer of the image thus produced. Despite all this
reciprocal interaction, there is no immersion here, although there can
arise an intense feeling of group bonding through reciprocal
identification of all the image subjects, which can easily be mistaken
for immersion in the image - and which is also responsible for the
phenomenon of what we elsewhere called sympathetic mimesis:
the feeling that it is our own soul that appears in the music. Real
immersion of the real body is only possible in a non-mimetic soundscape,
like Arsenij Avraamov's Simfoniya
Gudkov (1922), or in the soundscape of motorcyclists on the highway, or
in the chanting of slogans.
And, finally, there is also the interaction with the image as a means of
playing a game, but the aural image is here merely a kind of appendix to
the visual image.
We cannot conclude our analysis without reminding of another phenomenon
that is characteristic of the aural image. When we remind that the aural
appearance that belongs to the aural
subject can appear in the image in its totality, we also understand the
'oceanic experience' of the image subject when it hears a long sustained
sound in which overtones becomes audible, which cannot fail to have musical
space unfold in the vertical dimension, especially when this happens in
a reverberating space that is then completely filled with that sound, so
that it seems as if the audible body is no longer an isolated sound that
is heard in the centre of the aural space, whether or not resounding
amidst other sounds. That is especially the case when the singers produce
their own aural appearance that expands in space from the centre, like
in Stockhausens 'Stimmung', but also when musicians produces such a
sound in an echoing space like with
Phil Niblock. We are dealing here not so much with immersion of the aural
image subject in surrounding aural appearances, but with an all
encompassing expansion of the aural body. That reminds us of the fact
that immersion is merely a special variant of the relation of the
subject to the image space: next to that space in which the subject is
located in the middle of other aural appearances, there is also
the space that coincides with the appearance of the subject. The subject
and its appearance are no longer immersed here like in an ocean, rather
does it expand in an all-pervading aether.
THE AUDIOVISUAL IMAGE
Visual en aural images are often combined into audiovisual images: theatre, film, video
games...
Although I cannot see what is behind me, I can hear it, and
the car that moves from the front to the back remains audible although
it disappears from view.
That is why a scenic visual space is often combined with a panoramic aural
space (exemplary in the cinema with surround
sound). This can lead to the some discordance: whereas the
visual appearance disappears from view where the medium fields ends, the
aural appearance continues to move backwards without concomitant visual
appearance. A similar discordance occurs when both dimensions do not have
the same scale: as when the waterfalls on a giant visual screen is
rendered by a small surround installation, or the other way round .
The image subject that perceives the audiovisual image can appear in the audiovisual image without
or with its visual or aural appearance.
Discordance may arise when the audiovisual medium field is scenic: a
mother that, as an image subject, would reach with her hands to the baby
in the image while talking to it, would not hear her voice before the
screen, but on the same height as her hands in the image - and then
not experience it as her own voice. Only a combination of scenic visual
and aural panoramic medium field would do. On the other hand, the audiovisual medium
enables a differential incarnation in the image: the more convincing
aural appearance as a speaker before the screen makes the less
convincing appearance of the hands in the image obsolete. The immersion
of the appearance of the image subject is partial here not only in
comparison with the real world, but also in comparison with the audiovisual image medium.
As for the relation between image subject and image,
with two-dimensional filmthe
image subject takes a place that is the appropriate to the (here mostly
moving) image. Also the transition ofrom one sensory dimension to another is governed by changes in the structure of the
image - think of the off stage singing of Alfredo in Verdi's Traviata. And, also
here, there is only real interaction when the image subject appears
visually and/or aurally in the image, although the image subject
continues to purely contemplatively perceive its adventures in the audiovisual image space.
Here also, the real body of the real subject can interact with the image
medium and hence indirectly with the image. That is already the case
with the pure perception of a three-dimensional audiovisual image in
which the viewer can walk around, like in 'Sleep no
more' of Punchdrunk (2011); or when it is the real subject that
determines the transition from one sensory dimension to another (as when
it would open the door to see the person it heard).
There is nothing special to mention about productive interaction with
the image, and
about interaction of the image with the real subject, like that between
real musicians and
the hologram of a lead singer. Special attention
should be given to the aparte, scorned by Diderot: the addressing of
real subjects in the theatre by the actor, who thereby demonstrates that
he is no character, but an actor, and in the same breath stresses that
the image subjects are real subjects in the theatre. The image on the
scene is thereby unmasked as an image - Brecht's V-Effekt - which,
paradoxically enough, merely enhances the seductive power of the image,
as opposed to the contrary effect of having the image subject gaze at or
address the real subject, that only threatens to eventually destroy the
convincing power.
THE TACTILOVISUAL IMAGE
Next to audiovisual, there are also tactilovisual images, like stuffed
animals.
Let us begin with the analysis of the combined medium field, which is
far more problematic than with audiovisual images. To begin with,
tactile perception supposes proximity of the body of the real subject,
so that the visual field is narrowed accordingly. As a rule, tactilovisual images consist of a single object (mostly animal or man). As long
as the tactilovisual object is approached from a distance, it appears in
a real space, surrounded by a visual image space that gradually merges
with that real space - think of the stuffed animal on the child's bed.
Only after approaching does the tactile image space come into reach. The tactilovisual image subject uses not only the eye of the real body, but
also the touching hand, and, when embracing the stuffed animal, also the
feeling skin. Otherwise than the eye, which situates what it experiences
in space, the touch situates what it feels in the place where it feels.
That entails that the
image subject has a double location here: the place - the point
- from which the eye sees, and the place - the surface - where the
hand feels. The eye sees the hand, but the hand does not feel the eye:
that is why the tactile subject is subsumed under the visual subject,
which looks
down from the central siege to the branch in the periphery. Ideally, the visual
perception of the feeling hand has to be put between brackets, so that
the tactilovisual subject would only see the puppet, and not the visual
appearance of the feeling hand, that is part of the real subject, the
perception of which has to be put between brackets. And that goes not only
for the visual appearance of the hand, but also of its tactile
appearance. For, although the real subject does only touch the puppet
and not itself, it nevertheless feels its own hand; the feeling hand is touched herself, so that it cannot feel
without feeling itself, otherwise than the eye that does not become
visible when seeing.
That raises the question in how far the image subject can appear in the
image space with its tactiolovisual body. Suppose that the automaton of
Casanova were a tactile image, a robot in a silicone envelope; that
it were not Donald Sutherland who danced with the automaton, but the
real Casanova; that the image subject was not us who looked through
Fellini's camera, but Casanova himself seeing his own arms and hands
performing. No longer would
Casanova have to put the parts of his body that appear in the tactilovisual
image space between brackets: he would rather use them as an image medium.
From the visual point of view, the body is split into the invisible part
that continues to belong to the real subject, and the part that
functions as the visual appearance of the image subject - its arms and
hands. From a tactile point of view, the real body is split in the part
that feels the floor and the clothes, that continues to belong to the
real subject, and the part that is experienced as the appearance of the
image subject: the part that feels the sleeves and the skin of the
automaton, and that therewith also appears in the image as the feeling
hand.
The tactiovisual medium field runs straight through the body of Casanova.
The image subject and the concomitant tactilovisual appearance is
immersed in the image and interacts tactilovisually with it, although,
here also, it continues to passively contemplate its performance in tactilovisual image space. The immersion is partial in both domains:
only those parts of the body that remain visible for the actor, and the
parts of the skin that feel the automaton appear in the image.
This above analysis shows clearly that there can be no difference here
between the location and the scale of real body and image subject, for
the simple reason that the former is the medium support of the latter.
That the own body is used as
medium support for the production if the self appearance in the image,
does not necessarily mean that the body in the image has to have the
same identity as that of the real subject - our Casanova could as well play 'don Giovanni in
donna Anna's room'. Whereas with the panoramic or spherical
visual and aural image, there can only be a difference in location, with
the tactilovisual image there can be not difference is scale either.
That is why stuffed animals use to be adapted to the scale of the body of the
child.
After this analysis, we are well prepared to study the relation between real
subject and the image. The real Casanova with his real body is the
producer of the image in which the hand of the image
Casanova interact with the automaton - comparable with the hand in a
hand puppet, with the sole difference that not a puppet, but the own body
is used as medium support. There is interaction of the real body with
the image, but
no immersion, since that interaction is put between brackets, and
hence excluded form the image space, where Casanova as an image
subject contemplates the interaction of his appearance with the
automaton. And such exclusion could extend to the
relegation of perceptive and productive action by the real body of
specialised producers, although we then would have to invent a
scenario where a passive Casanova would be approached by an active tactilovisual robot.
In both cases, the tactilovisual image would interact with the real
body of Casanova - provoke reactions there, that could lead to the
cessation of the commerce with the tactilovisual image, or to the
combination of activity of the real body in the real world with the
contemplation of the tactilovisual image -
the child that falls asleep during cuddling his stuffed animal.
It will not have escaped the reader's attention that, otherwise than the visual
appearance of the image subject, which can appear on another location
than the body of real subject, the tactile appearance of the image subject
can only appear where the real subject feels, just like the aural
appearance of the image subject can only appear in the place where the
real image subject hears. A film in which we would see
Casanova dancing from his own perspective, combined with datagloves that
would simulate the tactile impression of touching the body of the
automaton, would bring no solace, since we would feel the touch not in
the place where Casanova saw his hand in the image, but in our own hand,
so that there would be a flagrant discordance.
Although it is conceivable that many image subjects perform the same
scenario with (a series of duplicates of) the same automaton, the fact that only
the own body can be used as image medium makes this kind of image more
appropriate to self-satisfaction than to the satisfaction of a a broader
public. That is especially the case with the mediumless image, that can
only exist as unique example:
DREAM AND DAYDREAM: THE
MEDIUMLESS IMAGINED IMAGE
Let us, next, turn to the study not
of perceptible images (unmediated
mimesis), but of the pure -mediumless - images that appear during sleep or during
daydreaming: dream images and fantasies (mediated
mimesis).
Dream images do not have an image medium: there is no part of the real world,
like a painted surface or an audible sound, in which an original
appears, and there is a fortiori no medium field. The dream subject -
which, as a real substrate, does not even dispose of senses - has direct access
to sensory images produced by the brain. There is no counterpart here of
what we call the real subject - except then the sleeping dreamer in bed.
Since dream images have no image medium, the dream space and the
concomitant dream subject are situated nowhere - not even in the head of
the real subjects, like the shamans knew, and like we tend to forget
when we place electrodes on the skulls of the sleepers. Although the
dream subject no longer perceives through the senses, its images pertain
to all the sensory domains, the inner ones included. The dream subject
is hence embodied in a complete image body.
Although it is impossible to asses the location and the size of
the imagined dream world and the dream subject, in the
dream the image subject is situated in the proper place between the
other dream images, and it views them from the proper perspective and
from within a body of the proper size. And, since the dream is a creation
of the dreamer himself, the dream subject can freely move in the dream
space: its location or its movements are no longer prescribed by artists or
through the limitations imposed by the image medium. And that
holds true not only of the movements, but also of the actions, which
as a rule are those of the real subject, and hence are performed with
the body that the dreamer has in the real world - wherein the dream
differs in principle from all images produced by a third party. For,
misled as we are by the hampered visibility of the own body for the own
eye, we all too readily suppose that the image subject takes
the place of the artist or of the character in the image through which
the author is looking - whereby we overlook the possibility that the
image can appear in the image with its own image and thus stage itself
for itself - possibility that already comes in view with the het aural image,
but that can only extend to all the sensory domains in the dream. In the
dream there is full interaction between the body of the dream subject
and the other appearances in all the sensory domains. Which does not
prevent the dream subject from only being able to contemplatively
witness the actions of its appearance in the dream - which is all too
evident when it has to wake up to stop unwanted developments in the
dream. Only in the dream, hence, is there complete immersion of the
image subject in the image space, and has the dream subject as a rule
the same identity as the real subject that is sleeping in the bed.
Totally different is the interaction between the dream image and the
real subject. The dream is created without perceptive activity of the
senses and without productive activity of the body of the real subject
- through brain modules or 'the unconscious' as a kind of inner third
party or 'deeper I'. The real subject with its real body is totally excluded from the image.
Since the real subject is sleeping, and since especially during the
dream sleep the access to perception and motility is blocked, there can
be no talk here of reactions of the real subject, let alone of a
combination of dreaming and action in the real world. Granted, the dream
often appears on occasion of the intrusion of a real perceptions - just
think of an erection - or, conversely, dream images may incite to real
action, as when the dreamer threatens to fall in the abyss or when the
fear of the burglar is so intense that the real subject calls for help and
wakes up. In both cases, dream and perception go hand in hand, until the
real subject wakes up and the dream comes to an end. Precisely because
the dream entails no productive activity, and excludes interaction with
the real world, it is the very paradigm not only of the immersive, but also
of the ideal contemplative image: pure contemplation of pure
representation, and complete and reciprocal interaction of image body
and dream image.
This analysis holds grosso modo also for the daydream. With
hallucinations, there is either a kind of 'medium field' or of a place
where the mediumless image appears, like in the grotto of Lourdes, or of
a seamless combination with perception of the real world .
NARRATIVE LITERATURE: THE MEDIATED IMAGINED IMAGE
Nearly related to the dream image are the images that are conjured up
in narrative literature. We have to distinguish here between the
conjured up images that are perceived by the image subject, and the
image conjuring (spoken or written) words that are heard or read by the
real subject.
Much of the above on dream images
applies also to conjured up images: the image space encompasses all sensory
dimensions, the inner ones
included (the feelings of the characters, their intentions, their dreams,
see Castorp). But there is a twofold
difference. To begin with, the body is not really asleep: it
is only neutralised in that it concentrates on reading and the execution
of the instructions of the author, more or less like in a daydream.
There is a real world again: the real body
that looks in the book in the real world, or the listening body like in 'The
reader'.
But above all, the image are no longer the
creations of the dreamer, but rather those of the author or the narrator: the reader
or the listener are merely the executor of his instructions. Just like
with perceptible images that are produced by a third party, the image
subject can only take the point of view of the artist - here: the
narrator. It does so mostly as a disembodied image subject, although it may also
become embodied and than act in the image space, namely when the author
himself hides in one of his characters (exemplary in the I-novel, but
also in the novel that is narrated by one of the characters, like
Robinson Crusoe, yes, even
in the you-novel, where the author invites the reader to imagine himself as
the character whose actions he narrates).
Just like in the dream, the image subject can interact with all the characters in the image space
in all the sensory dimensions. His immersion in the image is, hence,
complete. That does not prevent the image subject from merely passively
contemplating his all-encompassing interactions in the image space: these
are always dictated by the author.
As for the interaction between the real subject and the story, the
reader is a co-producer of the imagined story in that he executes the
instructions of the author. The story is a kind of score that contains
instructions about what images to conjure up. The creative input of the
real subject consists in filling in the suggestions of the narrator. Although
it is conceivable that we create visual images for our own consumption,
telling a story to oneself is not evident: rather than giving
instructions to oneself, it is more evident to
imagine them directly, like in daydreaming. It is conceivable, however,
that an author offers alternative versions of his story (like in
Brecht's Jasager und Neinsager), or that a story is written in
cooperation with the reader ('interactive novel'),
but, as opposed to the visual image (think of computer games), it is not common. In any case, he contribution of the reader
to
the creation of the images is rather restricted. The activity of the
real subject consists in reading and executing the instructions of the
author, an activity that is contemporary to the representation of the
story, but is put between brackets. Also here, the real world is
excluded from the image space, and there is no immersion of the real
reader in the image.
Next, there is the effect of the story on the real subject. Also here,
that can consist of 'spiritual', 'psychic' of 'somatic' effects, or of
real actions or intentions, in as far as the story is not the starting
point of daydreaming - and hence of the production of new images. Either
the reactions of the real subject disturb the production of the image
in that the subject has to stop reading, or it is possible to combine the
reaction with reading, so that the perception of the real body has not
to be put between brackets, but can be consciously perceived and enjoyed.
Also here is the subject therefore not immersed in the story: the
feelings are feelings of a real subject that remains outside
the image. The real subject has not the impression of being present in
Madam Bovary's carriage, although it can react to what the image subject
experience there. That goes also when the image subject appears in
the image with its body and soul: the real subject has not the
impression of being Robinson - although it can identify with that image subject
or other characters in the story. When the reaction of the real subject
extends to actions that are no longer compatible with reading, the
cohabitation of image subject
and real subject is disturbed. Reading, which implies that the reader is
holding a book, is far more problematic here than listening to a
narrator, especially since the listener is no longer alone, like the
reader - although the presence of the narrator can be more promising, as
is testified by the actions of ''The
reader', or by the child that is cuddled by the father when Polyphemus
enters the cave where Odysseus and his men are hiding - which makes it
abundantly clear that there is no immersion of the real subject
whatsoever.
Next to the interaction with the images, there is also the interaction
with the image medium: the place where the real world is no longer
perceived as such, but rather as a series of image conjuring signs.
Here, the
medium field is the domain where the real world is put between brackets
- the page of the book as the black hole in which the world disappears,
or like a worm hole that enables access to a parallel world. Otherwise
than with visual or aural images, the interaction with his medium can in
line with the interaction with the image, because, as a rule,
there is no relation whatsoever between the signs and their meaning:
otherwise than with the bodies of actors, singers or narrators, letters
are not precisely appropriate to commerce of whatever kind.
SUMMARY (1): IMAGE SUBJECT AND REAL SUBJECT
Let us, by way of conclusion, take up the central ideas again.
In matters of the image, it matters to discern two subjects; the
image subject that relates to the image, and the real subject that
relates to the real world. With
perceptible
images (unmediated mimesis) the image subject
has access to a monosensorial or plurisensorial image space through the
corollary senses. With
imagined
images, the image subject does not dispose of any sense, but nevertheless
has access to an image space in all sensory domains, the inner
senses included. Next, there is the real subject that disposes of a
complete body ('soul' and 'spirit' included). That real body is put
between brackets by the image subject. With perceptible images, that is
realised through selective perception and putting between brackets what
does not appear within the medium field, with the dream through blocking
perception and action during REM-sleep; with daydreams and stories
through the adoption of the 'representative modus'.
The image subject can appear in the image - depending on the sensory
domains covered by the image. The visual
image subject can thereby appear only partially (hands and front of the body), the aural integrally (voice,
sound of movement and action), the tactile in theory integrally, but
in practice mostly partially (e.g. only the hands). With plurisensorial
images
(audiovisual, tactilovisual), the immersion is more encompassing, but it
can never be integral, lest the image would no longer be an image, but
would coincide with reality.
Only with mediumless and mediated images, all the sensory domains are
covered, so that the image subject can enter the image space not only as
an outer appearance, but also as an inner one ('soul', 'spirit'). Just
like the disembodied image subject, also the
image subject that is embodied in the image space can have the same
identity as the real subject (Casanova who enacts himself as Casanova),
but just as well that of a character (Casanova who plays don Juan).
Location and scale of image subject and real subject may diverge.
Only with scenic visual and aural images can the
image subject have another
place
than the real subject: with
panoramic and spherical images it has the same location as the real
subject, and that is from the beginning the case with tactile images.
With scenic images, the
scale
of the image subject can
effortlessly be adapted to that of the image medium, which can be varied
ad libitum, but withpanoramic en spherical image media, it is the
length of the radius that determines the scale of the
appearances and therewith that of the image subject.
With tactile media, the image medium and the image subject
can only have one scale: that of the real subject. Scale and location
coincide here: the real body is used as an image medium. There are no
problems concerning location and scale with imagined images: these
are nowhere, so that the place and the scale of the appearance that
would belong tot the image subject are naturally adapted to those of the
other appearances.
SUMMARY (2): CONTEMPLATION AND
INTERACTION
Image subject as well as real subject can interact with the image. When
talking about a 'contemplative subject' or 'an interactive image', it is
important to remind that both can have a double meaning.
In a first meaning we are talking about interaction of the i
mage subject
with
the image. A first kind of interaction is the adaptation of scale,
location, and in many instances also of the perspective that is appropriate
to the image. A second kind of interaction is that of the appearance of
the image subject that enters the image space where it interacts with the
other appearances in the image. That interaction is more encompassing
when the image covers more than one sensory domain: it is minimal with monosensorial images, and
maximal with mental images (dream, story). But however encompassing the
interaction of image subject and/or image body with the other
appearances in the image may be, the image subject always passively
contemplates its actions in the image.
In a second meaning, we are talking about interaction of the image with
the real subject in its real body. In a first series of interactions, t
he
real subject interacts with the image(medium)
.
That is the case with all the actions that enable the perception of the
images: negative ones like putting between brackets of the perception of medium supports
and environment, the real body included, but also positive ones, like
the scanning of the image: eye-movements, movements of the head, walking
around in visual or aural images;
pushing, moving back and forward or stroking with tactile images, and so
on. This perceptive activity can entirely or partially be relegated to
the artist, so that the real subject can restrict itself to pure
contemplation. Second, there is the activity needed for the production
of the image. The production can be performed by the real subject that
belongs to the image subject: that is the case with all production for
one's own use. Or it can totally or partially be relegated to artist.
With images that have to be performed (theatre, film, music, stories),
the performance can be the task of the real subject that belongs to the
image subject (narrative), or be relegated to specialised performers: reciters, actors or musicians. The production can totally or
partially be relegated to automated producers: from mirrors, over
sensors that produce or activate more or less encompassing parts of the image, to
computer programs. With all these forms of cooperation, there is
interaction between co-producers: interactive versus solo production -
but before being interaction with the image, that is in the firs place
interaction with co-producers. although the image can be produced
individually or cooperatively - interactively - there is always
interaction of the real subject with the image.
All images
are interactive
, hence, in the productive sense - and what nowadays is
called 'interactive', is merely a particular form of interaction. When
the real subject (producer) is also image subject (consumer), the
productive activity is put between brackets. That is obsole when the
productive activity is totally or partially relegated to artists, so
that the image subject can devote itself to the contemplation of the
image undisturbed, so that there is no longer interaction with the
image, so that it appears to be non-interative - contemplative. In that
respect the dream is the paradigm of the non-interactive image. In a
second series,
the image
interacts with the real subject.
The (spiritual, psychic or somatic) reaction of the real
subject remains contemplative, as long as it does not proceed to action.
But, also then, his activity can be compatible with the contemplative
relation of the image subject with the image (e.g. self-castigation or
self-satisfaction). In other cases, the relation with the image is
suspended. Both kinds of interaction can be combined when an aural image
induces the real subject to produce a similar aural image through
singing or playing together, or to complete it with to an audiovisual
image through producing the concomitant visual appearance. The image subject
continues to passively contemplate the image, although the real subject
proceeds to the production of duplicates in interaction with other
producers.
All these forms of interaction between image and real subject must be
clearly distinguished from interaction with other real subjects, like
the interaction during cooperation in the production of the image. A
more spectacular example is the interaction between players of a game,
where images are used to enable the game altogether:
from the chess piece to the images on a computer screen. In its turn, the
interaction between the players should not be confused with the
interaction of each player with the image during its production, which
can, in its turn, be a form of interaction with co-producers (that made
the chess pieces or wrote the computer programs).
As opposed to the propensity to put the interaction of the real subject
between brackets or to relegate it to artists in view of the undisturbed
contemplation of the image, there is the converse propensity to have the
real subject that belongs to the image subject interact with the image.
Such productive activity disturbs the contemplative relation of the
image subject, but enhances the charm of activities that accompany the
relation to the image - enjoying the productive activity ('creativity'),
especially when it is cooperative, and hence group binding, like
with singing or playing together. In other cases, activities can be
enjoyed that would be impossible without relying on images: from erotic
gratification to competitive pleasure (games). In all cases, the image
is used as a means of realising other goals that enjoying the image as
such.
SUMMARY (3): EXCLUSION AND INCLUSION (IMMERSION)
After having examined the interaction between real subject and image
subject on the one hand, and the image on the other, we can investigate
in how far the contemplative or interactive subjects are excluded from
the image, or in how far they are included in it - immersed in it.
Immersion of the image subject in the image is possible, albeit in
varying extent. In terms of sensory domains,
it can cover from one to several domains with perceptible images, and
all domains with imagined images. And, next to the immersion of the
disembodied, purely experiencing subject, there is also the immersion of
(a part of) the concomitant appearance(s). With the scenic image, the image subject
is referred to the margin of the image space, where the aural image subject
cannot appear in an aural embodiment, and the visual only with its front
side. With panoramic and spherical images, the image subject is located
in the centre of the image space, where the visual image subject cannot
appear visually, whereas the aural image subject can be
integrally and centrally immersed. Already with the tactile
component of the tactilovisual image, it appears that the image subject
is not always a point in a surrounding space: it can also take
the shape of a surface, or even of a volume enclosed by a surface. To the tactile subject, immersion
can only mean being touched everywhere, like with literal immersion in
water, and to the inner senses only expansion ('filled with joy'): the
removal of the enclosure through that surface. Immersion, then, turns
out to be a mere variant of two other forms of inclusion: being enclosed
and expanding.
Impossible in principle is immersion (inclusion, expansion)
of the real body in the image. However much the real subject may be
involved in creating the image, however much it may use its own body as
a medium support, it will never be part of the image. Quite the contrary:
the more active the real subject, to more its activity has to be put
between brackets if the image subject wants to contemplate the image
undisturbed. It is precisely to avoid such putting between brackets, that
a second kind of exclusion is so popular: the relegation of the
production to specialised artists. That the impression of being immersed
is nevertheless so insistent, is due to the fact that artists, in an
effort to create the illusion that the image is real, often have an
appearance in the image look at or talk to the real subject. An
impression of immersion can also arise when the
image space is confounded with the medium field; when it is not scenic, but panoramic, spherical, or when it is
fully three-dimensional, like
in a sculpture group like Gormley's 'Another place' (or a real
soundscape), the real subject is surrounded by the medium field indeed -
but being in the centre of a medium field is not the same as being in
the centre of
the image space. The impression of immersion can equally arise when a
real body is immersed in appearances that belong to the real world, but
nevertless are considered to be images, because they are exhibited (whether
or not in a place where normally images are shown): think of Gormley's
mist installation of Gormley (2007), James Turrell's light spaces, or
Christo's 'Big air Package' in Oberhausen, or of a non-mimetic
soundscapes like Arsenij Avraamov's Simfoniya Gudkov (1922). In alt these
cases, were are not dealing with images in
image space, but with real appearances in real space, not different in
essence from the immersion in the wealth of a flowering meadow in a
blossoming orchard, or from the drone of a horde of motorcyclists on the
highway - if not from the literal submersion in water.
There equally is no immersion when image conjuring signs incite
declamators, singers or musicians to recite, sing or play together:
although they produce an image in image space, their real reciting,
singing or playing bodies are left behind in the real world. Granted, a
genuine sense of belonging, of being immersed in the group in a
metaphorical sense, is often the correlate of such collective activity,
but being involved in a group is quite different from being immersed
in the image space. And that goes also when real singing of
dancing is replaced with identification of the real subject with the aural image
(Isolde(s 'Wogender Schwall').
ABGESANG
This text shows that the many efforts to revitalise the image through
interaction or immersion,
have led to the discovery of new kinds of gratification on the one hand,
but threaten to disturb the bliss of a purely contemplative relation to
the image.. Progress in the domain of the image:
once more a mere centrifugal move...
© Stefan Beyst,
december 2013.
* not to confound with Husserl's 'Bildsubjekt' van Husserl, where it
refers to what is to be seen in the image.